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Abstract
We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets.
The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under un-
certainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as
well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is
that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity genera-
tion (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond
to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities
exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest
that some of the most popular promotion instruments cause welfare losses.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, many governments have introduced support schemes for
electricity from renewable energy sources. According to the International Energy
Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2011, $ 44 billion were used for these subsidies
in 2010. In many countries, it is a declared political goal to further raise renewables’
market share, so the total amount of subsidies will probably rise. In the “New Policies
Scenario” projections, which assume that the governments stick with their plans and
serve as the baseline scenario, the IEA expects subsidies to reach almost $ 180 billion
per year in 2035 (IEA, 2011).
Without questioning whether this level of support is justified, the aim of this article
is to derive optimal subsidy policies, so as to analyze whether currently popular promo-
tion schemes are efficient. There is a large literature on reasons to promote renewable
energies, of which the most important ones are learning spillover effects in manufac-
turing and second-best abatement of greenhouse gas emissions.1 However, what has
largely been neglected are the incentives of particular promotion policies regarding the
supply behavior of renewable-energy capacity owners and their impact on welfare.
In this article, we close this gap and explicitly consider the policy implications of
a distinguishing characteristic of electricity markets, namely, the difference between
capacity and electricity generation. We analyze first-best subsidies for electricity gener-
ation technologies, taking external benefits of capacity and of electricity generation into
account, of which zero externalities of either capacity or generation are special cases.
By “first-best”, we mean that the government has full information and it has access to
non-distortive means of financing the subsidies (i.e., lump-sum taxes).
We find that marginal subsidies for electricity generation should equal its marginal
external benefits, and marginal subsidies for capacity should cover marginal external
benefits of capacity. While this seems trivial at first glance, it allows us to derive a
number of policy-relevant conclusions. For example, it implies that if there are only
1See, for example, Rasmussen (2001), Jaffe et al. (2005), Bennear and Stavins, 2007, Kverndokk
and Rosendahl (2007), Fischer and Newell (2008), Helm and Schöttner (2008), Gerlagh et al. (2009),
Kalkuhl et al. (2013).
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externalities of capacity (for instance, knowledge spillover effects of photovoltaic mod-
ules), then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Furthermore, only
under very specific circumstances do optimal promotion schemes for renewable en-
ergy resemble the demand-independent “fixed feed-in tariffs” that are popular in many
countries.
Our model uses the framework of a competitive peak-load pricing model – that is,
the decision variable is the supply quantity, but in situations of high demand, supply
can be limited by capacity. We are not aware of any literature that explicitly analyzes
optimal subsidies in such a framework.2 The model’s unique characteristic is the sep-
aration of capacity and production as targets of subsidies. To focus on the basic prin-
ciples shaping optimal subsidies, we assume that there is only one moment in which
electricity generation and consumption take place and that there is only one electricity
generation technology. While we think that neither of these assumptions changes the
general insights of the model, we recognize that the full implications of these subsidies
in a dynamic multi-technology market would have to be modeled explicitly.
While there is a large literature on renewable-energy promotion, as far as we know,
only Bläsi and Requate (2010) and Reichenbach and Requate (2012) consider the impli-
cations of distinguishing between capacity and electricity generation. In these papers,
learning spillover effects of capacity production are taken into account, making output
subsidies for renewable-energy capacity producers optimal. However, in these models,
electricity demand is deterministic and “capacity” is the number of firms, so that the
distinction between capacity and electricity generation requires increasing marginal
generation costs. By contrast, our model takes into account that at the moment of
investment, demand and capacity availability are uncertain. Moreover, we model ca-
pacity as an explicit limit to electricity generation, which also allows to incorporate the
case of constant marginal generation cost. In particular, this includes technologies like
wind and solar power for which zero generation costs can be assumed.
2For an excellent survey of the theory of peak-load pricing, see Crew et al. (1995). For current
applications of this model framework to electricity markets, see Borenstein and Holland (2005), Joskow
and Tirole (2007) or, with renewable energy sources, see Chao (2011).
2
Implicitly, Newbery (2012) also distinguishes the different sources of positive exter-
nalities by stating that capacity rather than electricity generation should be promoted
for the case of wind energy. We analyze this point in a general way using a formal
model.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the model setting in Section 2.1, derive
a social planner’s solution in Section 2.2, and a decentralized solution in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 defines the optimal subsidies. As an application, we assess the promotion of
renewables by fixed feed-in tariffs in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results.
2 Model
2.1 The Market Environment
We consider a partial-equilibrium model of a market in which a good in the amount of q
is traded. We assume that this good is electricity generated by some renewable energy
source like biofuel, wind or photovoltaics.3 Supply is limited by available capacity ak,
where capacity is denoted by k and the capacity availability variable 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 takes
into account that at least some renewable energy technologies, in particular wind and
solar energy, are not always completely available. a = 0 means that built capacity
cannot be used, and a = 1 implies complete availability.
The model consists of two stages; the market stage follows the investment stage. In
the investment stage, capacity k is built while the state of electricity demand, z, and the
availability of capacity, a, are unknown. Thus, we have a setting of peak-load pricing
under supply and demand uncertainty. In the market stage, a and z are drawn from
a random distribution F (a, z), with a density function f(a, z). z is bounded between
zl and zh, where zh > zl. Thus, zh is the highest and zl is the lowest state of demand.
The price p is determined by electricity generation q and an inverse demand function
3The model is fairly general. It should be applicable to any sector in which a distinction between
capacity and production is relevant and either of these can be the source of externalities. An important
example is agriculture.
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p ≡ p(q, z).4 For higher values of z, demand is higher for every quantity q, that is, the
demand curve is shifted upwards: ∂p(q, z)/∂z > 0.
There are two kinds of costs. Capacity k is built in the investment stage with an
investment cost function C(k). Generation costs of electricity are c(q) and accrue in the
market stage. Generation is limited by available capacity, q ≤ ak. In both stages, there
may be positive externalities, measured in money terms.5 Capacity externalities (such
as learning spillovers) are denoted by B(k), and electricity generation externalities
(such as carbon abatement) are b(q).6 Both are assumed to be concave functions, so
they have non-increasing marginal effects.
In the second stage, consumer surplus v and producer surplus s are given by
v(q, z) ≡
∫ q
0
p(q˜, z)dq˜ − p(q, z)q, (1)
s(q, z) ≡ p(q, z)q − c(q). (2)
The total market-stage welfare w is the sum of consumer surplus v, producer surplus s,
and external benefits of production b:
w(q, z) ≡ v(q, z) + s(q, z) + b(q) =
∫ q
0
p(q˜, z)dq˜ − c(q) + b(q). (3)
Letting E denote expectations, total expected welfare reads
W ≡ E [w(q(a, z), z)] +B(k)− C(k)
=
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
f(a, z)w(q(a, z), z) da dz +B(k)− C(k), (4)
where q(a, z) is the generated electricity in state (a, z).
4We assume that the functions have the typical characteristics, like a negative slope of the demand
function, a non-negative slope of the marginal production costs function etc., and mention those that we
deem important for clarification.
5The model could be reverted to analyze negative externalities of capacity and generation of elec-
tricity from fossil fuels.
6Both kinds of externalities are discussed in Section 4.
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2.2 Socially Optimal Energy Generation and Investment Decisions
In this section we derive how a social planner, who can directly choose an optimal
allocation of investment and generation, would maximize total welfare. We maximize
the total expected welfare, (4), by maximizing the following Lagrangian:
Lw =
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
f(a, z)w(q(a, z), z) da dz +B(k)− C(k)
+
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
λw(a, z) [ak − q(a, z)] da dz. (5)
λw(a, z) is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the capacity constraint in state (a, z), and thus
the shadow price of capacity in that state. Generation cannot be negative, q ≥ 0. Taking
this non-negativity condition into account, the first-order conditions for the optimal
electricity generation q in each state (a, z) are:7
∂Lw
∂q
= f(a, z)∂w(q
∗(a, z), z)
∂q
− λ∗w(a, z) ≤ 0, q∗(a, z) ≥ 0, q∗(a, z)
∂Lw
∂q
= 0. (6a)
The first-order conditions for the optimal choice of capacity are:
∂Lw
∂k
= B′(k∗)− C ′(k∗) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
aλ∗w(a, z) da dz ≤ 0, k∗ ≥ 0, k∗
∂Lw
∂k
= 0, (6b)
and, finally, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for each state,
∂Lw
∂λw
= ak∗ − q∗(a, z) ≥ 0, λ∗w(a, z) ≥ 0, λ∗w(a, z)
∂Lw
∂λw
= 0, (6c)
determine when to use full capacity. The asterisks denote (social) optimality of our
choice variables q, k, and λw.
Firstly, we can derive an optimal supply rule. For this, we can distinguish three
cases, consisting of combinations of the state and available capacity. Depending on the
level of demand, it may either be optimal to generate at the capacity limit, q = ak, or to
generate a positive amount below the capacity limit, 0 < q < ak, or to generate nothing
7For the general methods of non-linear optimization see, for example, Chiang and Wainwright
(2005).
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at all, q = 0. In the following, we derive the conditions for the respective decision to be
optimal.
In the first case, using all available capacity is optimal, q∗(a, z) = ak > 0.8 By
condition (6a), this implies
λ∗w(a, z) = f(a, z)
∂w(ak, z)
∂q
, (7)
which must be non-negative by (6c), i.e., ∂w(ak, z)/∂q ≥ 0. Thus, all available capacity
is used if marginal welfare of generation is still non-negative at the capacity limit, and
the shadow price of capacity for the respective state equals marginal welfare weighted
by the state’s density. In general, marginal welfare of generation is
∂w(q, z)
∂q
= p(q, z)− c′(q) + b′(q), (8)
so q∗(a, z) = ak would imply that the price of electricity (that is, the marginal gross con-
sumer surplus) and marginal externalities of generation at the capacity limit together
are at least as high as marginal generation costs.
In the second case, a positive generation below the capacity limit is optimal, ak >
q∗(a, z) > 0. By condition (6a) and (6c),
λ∗w(a, z) = f(a, z)
∂w(q∗(a, z), z)
∂q
= 0. (9)
Thus, generation is stopped below the capacity limit if marginal welfare is zero, and,
hence, welfare cannot be increased by extending generation. In other words, if capacity
is not scarce, its shadow price is zero.
The third and final case is that in which zero generation is optimal. Again, (6c) tells
us that the shadow price of capacity in such states is zero. By (6a), we can see that zero
generation is optimal if even the first produced unit does not yield positive marginal
welfare.
8In the following discussion, we assume, without loss of generality, that k > 0.
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Summarizing, we have the following optimal supply rule:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Supply). The welfare-maximizing supply is defined as follows:
q∗(a, z) =

ak if f(a, z)∂w(ak,z)
∂q
= λ∗w(a, z) ≥ 0,
q∗ ∈ [0, ak] if f(a, z)∂w(q∗(a,z),z)
∂q
= λ∗w(a, z) = 0,
0 if f(a, z)∂w(0,z)
∂q
≤ 0 = λ∗w(a, z).
(10)
In the following, we just write q∗, λ∗w to economize on notation. We can determine
the impact of changes in the state of demand by differentiating the optimality condition
for state (a, z) with respect to q and a and rearranging:
∂q∗
∂z
=

∂2w(q∗,z)/∂q∂z
−∂2w(q∗,z)/∂q2 =
∂p(q∗,z)/∂z
−∂2w(q∗,z)/∂q2 if q
∗(a, z) ∈ (0, ak),
0 else,
(11)
where the first case derives from differentiating the first-order condition (9). The de-
nominator in (11) is positive due to the usual assumptions about cost and benefit func-
tions. Thus, the higher the demand, the more electricity should be generated as long
as the capacity limit is not reached. Similarly,
∂q∗
∂a
=

k if q∗(a, z) = ak,
0 else.
(12)
This means that higher capacity availability raises electricity generation if capacity is
the relevant limit. By contrast, if generation below the capacity limit is optimal, then
an increase in available capacity does not change optimal generation.
We complete the socially optimal allocation by deriving the optimal investment rule.
The first-order conditions for optimal capacity choice, (6b), can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Proposition 2 (Optimal Investment). Capacity is chosen so that marginal investment
costs equal the sum of its direct marginal externalities and the sum of shadow prices of
7
available capacity in all states, weighted by the share of capacity that is available,
C ′(k∗) = B′(k∗) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
aλ∗w(a, z) da dz, (13)
given that there is a non-negative amount of capacity for which both sides of this equation
are also non-negative. Otherwise, zero capacity is built.
Proof. Evaluate (6b) for k∗ > 0.
From the discussion above, we know that the shadow price of capacity is positive
only in those states in which available capacity limits generation: q∗ = ak. As given
in (13), marginal investment costs must pay off in these states. Moreover, if only a
fraction a of capacity k is available in state (a, z), the shadow price is weighted by a
– low availability makes it more expensive to have available capacity. For example,
photovoltaic capacity is less valuable if sunshine is rare. Furthermore, states of high
demand justify more capacity investment if it is probable that they actually occur. This
follows from the fact that, by (9), the shadow price for a state equals marginal welfare
weighted by the density of that state.
Note two implications of the welfare-maximizing allocation. Firstly, the larger ca-
pacity externalities B(k), the more capacity is built, and the more states (a, z) in which
there is idle capacity. If there are very large benefits of building capacity, it may even
be true that full capacity should never be used. This can be seen by recognizing that
(13) could be fulfilled even if the shadow price is zero for all states. Marginal capacity
externalities B′(k∗) must then equal marginal investment costs C ′(k∗).
Secondly, we can characterize which market price will be observed in state (a, z):
Proposition 3 (Optimal Market Price of Electricity). Define the generation quantity qˆ(z)
by p(qˆ, z) = c′(qˆ).
(i) Suppose that q∗ = ak ≤ qˆ(z). Then,
p(ak, z) + b′(ak) ≥ p(ak, z) ≥ c′(ak) ≥ 0
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in optimum.
(ii) Suppose that q∗ ≥ qˆ(z). Then, c′(q∗)− p(q∗, z) = b′(q∗) ≥ 0 and p(q∗, z) R 0.
Proof. (i) follows by definition from the facts that the price is determined by the de-
mand function, that the demand function is downward sloping, that externalities are
non-negative, and that the marginal cost function is non-negative and has a non-
negative slope. (ii) follows from these facts and the fact that marginal welfare as
defined in (8) must be zero.
Point (i) of the proposition tells that if socially optimal generation is limited by ca-
pacity, it must be true that the price is above marginal generation costs. Point (ii) states
the fact that in optimum, the price is lower than marginal generation costs if there are
positive externalities and generation is not constrained by capacity. However, a welfare
loss always results when the price is lower than marginal generation costs minus the
marginal externalities from generation. Note that the price is always positive if every
generated amount of electricity meets a positive willingness to pay. However, such
an assumption about (short-run) electricity demand functions is not realistic, because
every generated kWh has to be used in the same moment and cannot be stored (in
relevant amounts). Thus, in electricity markets negative prices can occur.
2.3 Decentralized Allocation
We now consider the behavior of profit-maximizing firms under perfect competition.
The aim is to derive how much they invest and generate, given a certain structure of
subsidies, so that we can later derive optimal subsidies. To stick with the notion of
producer surplus from (2), we define the operators’ second-stage profits by
pi(q, a, z) = p(a, z)q + χ(q, a, z)− c(q), (14)
which differs from producer surplus by the subsidy χ. The latter is a payment from
the government to the firms, which may depend on the generated quantity, the state
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of demand, and the availability of capacity – this allows derivation of whether it is
actually optimal to condition subsidies on these variables. We write p(a, z) instead of
p(q, z) because firms take the price in state (a, z) as given; they are assumed to behave
competitively and thus do not take their influence on the price into account. Total
expected profit is given by
Π ≡ E [pi(q(a, z), a, z)] + σ(k)− C(k)
=
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
f(a, z)pi(q(a, z), a, z) da dz + σ(k)− C(k), (15)
where σ(k) is a subsidy for capacity installation. We assume for χ(q, a, z) and σ(k)
that they are continuous, concave functions of q and k, respectively – that is, marginal
subsidies are constant or decreasing. The investors’ Lagrangian is
Lpi =
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
f(a, z)pi(q(a, z), a, z) da dz + σ(k)− C(k)
+
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
λpi(a, z) [ak − q(a, z)] da dz, (16)
and the first-order conditions are
∂Lpi
∂q
= f(a, z)∂pi(q
#(a, z), a, z)
∂q
− λ#pi (a, z) ≤ 0, q#(a, z) ≥ 0,
q#(a, z)∂Lpi
∂q
= 0 (17a)
for profit-maximizing electricity generation in each state (a, z),
∂Lpi
∂k
= σ′(k#)− C ′(k#) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
aλ#pi (a, z) da dz ≤ 0, k# ≥ 0, k#
∂Lpi
∂k
= 0 (17b)
for the firms’ choice of capacity, and, finally, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of each state
(a, z),
∂Lpi
∂λpi
= ak# − q#(a, z) ≥ 0, λ#pi (a, z) ≥ 0, λ#pi (a, z)
∂Lpi
∂λpi
= 0, (17c)
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where # denotes profit maximization. The interpretation is exactly the same as in the
case of the social planner’s optimality conditions (6), except that marginal profit takes
the place of marginal welfare. For equilibrium generation q#(a, z), marginal profit is
given by
∂pi(q#(a, z), a, z)
∂q
= p(q#(a, z), z) + ∂χ(q
#(a, z), a, z)
∂q
− c′(q#(a, z)). (18)
We can solve for the firms’ supply behavior along the lines of solving (17), and summa-
rize:
Proposition 4. The profit-maximizing supply is defined as follows:
q#(a, z) =

ak if f(a, z)∂pi(ak,a,z)
∂q
= λ#pi (a, z) ≥ 0,
q# ∈ [0, ak] if f(a, z)∂pi(q#(a,z),a,z)
∂q
= λ#pi (a, z) = 0,
0 if f(a, z)∂pi(0,a,z)
∂q
≤ 0 = λ#pi (a, z).
(19)
The supply rule says that the firms use all available capacity, q# = ak, if the market’s
willingness to pay for electricity plus the marginal generation subsidy is at least as large
as marginal generation costs at the capacity limit. A positive amount of electricity below
the capacity limit, ak > q# > 0, is generated if this sum is zero, and none is generated
if even the first generated unit of electricity does not yield a profit.
Likewise, we can solve (17b) for the firms’ investment rule and summarize:
Proposition 5 (Profit-Maximizing Investment). Capacity is chosen so that marginal in-
vestment costs equal the sum of marginal capacity subsidies and the sum of shadow prices
of available capacity in all states, weighted by the share of capacity that is available,
C ′(k#) = σ′(k#) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
aλ#pi (a, z) da dz, (20)
given that there is a non-negative amount of capacity for which both sides of this equation
are also non-negative. Else, zero capacity is built.
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2.4 Decentralizing the First-Best Solution: Optimal Subsidies
A welfare-maximizing government can use subsidies to reproduce the first-best alloca-
tion. Firms choose the socially optimal allocation if the following conditions are met.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Subsidies: Necessary Conditions).
(i) Consider the states (a, z) for which the optimal supply rule from Proposition 1 implies
using all available capacity, q∗(a, z) = ak. For these states it must hold that
p(ak, z) + ∂χ(ak, a, z)
∂q
− c′(ak) ≥ 0. (21)
(ii) Consider the states (a, z) for which the optimal supply rule from Proposition 1 yields
an interior solution, q∗(ak, z) ∈ (0, ak). For these states it must hold that
∂χ(q∗, a, z)
∂q
− b′(q∗) = 0. (22)
(iii) Consider the states (a, z) for which the optimal supply rule from Proposition 1 yields
zero generation, q∗(a, z) = 0. For these states it must hold that
p(0, z) + ∂χ(0, a, z)
∂q
− c′(0) ≤ 0. (23)
(iv) For firms’ investment according to Proposition 5 to be optimal as described in Propo-
sition 2, it must hold that
B′(k∗)− σ′(k∗) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
a
[
λ∗w(ak, z)− λ#pi (ak, a, z)
]
da dz = 0. (24)
Proof. We start with the inner solution, case (ii). For a positive generation below ca-
pacity, q = q∗(a, z) < ak, to be both socially optimal and profit-maximizing, we need
p(q∗, z)− c′(q∗) + b′(q∗) = 0,
p(q∗, z) + ∂χ(q
∗, a, z)
∂q
− c′(q∗) = 0
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from (6) and (8), (17) and (18). Solving these equations, we see that (22) must
hold. For (iii) and (i), the exact level of generation subsidies is not important because
firms cannot use more than all available capacity or less than none – see the firms’
optimal supply rule in Proposition 4. (iv) is implied by equating (13) and (20) and
rearranging.
In particular, the following subsidy scheme fulfills these necessary conditions:9
Proposition 7 (Optimal Subsidies: Sufficient Conditions). The subsidy scheme (consist-
ing of generation subsidies and capacity subsidies) is optimal if for all states (a, z)
∂χ(q∗, a, z)
∂q
= b′(q∗), (25)
and if
σ′(k∗) = B′(k∗). (26)
Proof. If the shadow prices in the first-order condition sets of welfare maximization, (6)
and profit maximization, (17) are identical for the same capacity level, then generation
decisions must be identical as well. This, in turn, is true if marginal welfare (8) and
marginal profit (18) of q∗ coincide for the same available capacity. Substituting (25) in
these equations shows that they always do. (24) then implies (26).
This yields a simple rule for optimal subsidies. Firstly, marginal generation subsi-
dies should equal marginal external benefits of generation in every state of demand
and capacity availability. Secondly, marginal capacity subsidies should equal marginal
external benefits of capacity. We show in detail what the optimal-subsidy rules imply
for the dependence of optimal subsidies on the state in Appendix A.1.
9There can be other subsidy schemes fulfilling the necessary conditions. Yet, these schemes are
complex and, presumably, unrealistic for a real-world application. For example, for states in which all
capacity is to be used, subsidies can be arbitrarily high as long as (21) is fulfilled. However, this implies
that the shadow price of capacity for the firms exceeds the social shadow price. To still induce optimal
investment, (24) then implies that marginal capacity subsidies must be lower than marginal capacity
externalities to counterbalance this difference.
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3 Application: Assessing the Promotion of Renewables
by Fixed Feed-in Tariffs
Under a fixed feed-in tariff system, an operator of renewable-energy capacity receives
a certain amount of money for every unit of electricity that is generated and fed into
the grid. Such subsidies are one of the most widely applied instruments to promote
renewable energies (cf. IEA/IRENA, 2014). In this section we demonstrate that they
can be optimal only under very specific assumptions.
If the instrument to promote renewables is a fixed tariff φ per unit of electricity, then
the tariff φ itself does not depend on the generated quantity q. The firms’ second-stage
profit (14) becomes:
pi(q) = φq − c(q). (27)
The firms’ Lagrangian is
Lφ =
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
f(a, z) [φq − c(q)] da dz − C(k)
+
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
λφ(a, z) [ak − q(a, z)] da dz, (28)
so that the first-order conditions corresponding to (17) are
∂Lφ
∂q
= f(a, z) [φ− c′(q)]− λ#φ (a, z) ≤ 0, q#(a, z) ≥ 0, q#(a, z)
∂Lφ
∂q
= 0 (29a)
for profit-maximizing electricity generation in each state (a, z),
∂Lφ
∂k
= −C ′(k#) +
∫ zh
zl
∫ 1
0
aλ#φ (a, z) da dz ≤ 0, k# ≥ 0, k#
∂Lφ
∂k
= 0 (29b)
for the firms’ choice of capacity, and, finally, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of each state
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(a, z),
∂Lφ
∂λφ
= ak# − q#(a, z) ≥ 0, λ#φ (a, z) ≥ 0, λ#φ (a, z)
∂Lφ
∂λφ
= 0. (29c)
Let us firstly consider technologies with constant marginal generation costs. In par-
ticular, this includes those renewable-energy technologies that have zero marginal gen-
eration costs: Wind energy and photovoltaics. The difference between the tariff and
marginal generation costs, φ−c′(q), then is the same in all states (a, z). This is also true
for the shadow price λ#φ of capacity. If φ − c′(q) is positive, then all available capacity
is always used. If it is zero or negative, then no capacity is built. Thus, a fixed feed-in
tariff can only be an optimal way of promoting such a technology if available capacity
should always be used completely.
What about technologies with increasing marginal generation costs (for which bio-
fuel plants may be an example)? Again, if it is socially optimal always to use all avail-
able capacity, then implementing this behavior is possible with a fixed feed-in tariff
that is high enough to make the firms’ shadow price always positive. However, if this
is not the case, (29a) and (29c) show that generation below the capacity limit can be
incentivized if the tariff equals marginal generation cost for that quantity and, thus, the
shadow price of capacity is zero:
φ− c′(q) = λ#φ (a, z) = 0. (30)
Suppose that such an interior solution is chosen for one state (a, z). Because φ is the
same in all states, the same generation quantity must be profit-maximizing for all other
demand states. Thus, any capacity larger than the amount necessary to fulfill (30)
would never be used and cannot pay off. But then (30) cannot describe an interior
solution if firms invest according to (29b). Therefore, we can conclude that a fixed
feed-in tariff can only incentivize to build an amount of capacity that is used whenever
it is available. In brief, a fixed feed-in tariff can, in general, be optimal only if it is
always optimal to use all available capacity.
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To analyze whether this can be true for actual electricity markets, note that using
full capacity is optimal if the price for electricity plus the marginal externalities of gen-
eration at the capacity limit always (at least) cover marginal generation costs. Because
marginal generation costs and externalities are not directly observable, it is difficult to
demonstrate welfare losses in empirical data. Yet we think that there are at least some
indications to welfare losses due to fixed feed-in tariffs.
In Germany, we occasionally observe hours with negative electricity prices, but, at
the same time, electricity from renewables is generated. Even if we assume the lowest
marginal generation costs, zero, which is plausible for wind and solar power, fixed
feed-in tariffs can only be optimal when there are marginal generation externalities
that are equivalent to the negative prices. Given that there have been hours in which
the wholesale price for electricity in Germany was around –500e per MWh, it does not
seem likely that there are generation externalities that justify this.10
Note that strongly negative prices are only the most obvious sign that fixed feed-in
tariffs may induce welfare losses. For renewables with positive marginal generation
costs, like biomass, welfare losses can also occur when the price is positive, namely,
whenever the price falls below marginal generation costs minus marginal generation
externalities. If there are no marginal generation externalities (which we argue in the
discussion below), then welfare losses occur whenever the price falls below marginal
generation costs.
Summarizing, fixed feed-in tariffs are suboptimal as soon as it is not optimal to
use all available capacity, i.e., as soon as renewables should respond to demand. In
electricity markets with a small share of renewables capacity, this might be of minor
relevance. However, in electricity markets with a considerable capacity of renewables
(in relation to demand), these considerations are important. For instance, in Germany
the cumulative capacity of photovoltaics and wind energy together, given full availabil-
ity, account for more than 60 GW, while demand usually is between 30 GW and 80
GW (see ENTSO-E, 2014). Thus, it is obvious that renewables are not a niche product
10For illustrations and discussions of negative-price occurrences in Germany see, for example, Andor
et al. (2010) or Brandstätt et al. (2011).
16
anymore in the German electricity market, but have a considerable market share and
thus should respond to demand.
4 Discussion
This article has shown that defining the rationale to support renewable energies is cru-
cial to identify the optimal promotion instrument. If positive externalities arise from
the production and installation of renewable energies capacity, but not from the gen-
eration of electricity, then generation-based instruments (like all kinds of feed-in tariffs
as well as renewable portfolio standards) are suboptimal. They distort the supply deci-
sion, and thus cause welfare losses. Instead, a capacity subsidy that is equivalent to the
externality would maximize welfare.
In contrast, if externalities arise from the generation of electricity, but not from
capacity, a generation-based subsidy that reflects this benefit would maximize welfare.
However, fixed feed-in tariffs are most probably not the adequate instrument. Instead,
a subsidy that is paid on top of the market price and reflects the generation externality
should be used. Finally, if there are externalities from both renewable capacity and
electricity generation by renewables, then a combination of a generation subsidy and
a capacity subsidy is optimal. It should be clear that the magnitudes of the subsidies
should correspond to the specific externalities.
Thus, economists should carefully identify the reasons for and the aims of promoting
renewable energies. Once they are clear, we can systematically derive the optimal
promotion of renewables. To be concrete, we briefly describe normative conclusions
that arise from this model based on assumptions that we deem plausible.
Basic economic theory suggests direct caps on or prices for emitting greenhouse
gases as first-best instruments for internalizing this negative externality of fossil fuel.
Therefore, we do not see them as a reason to promote electricity generation from re-
newable energies. In contrast, learning spillovers seem to be a plausible reason to
promote renewables (see, for instance, Fischer and Newell, 2008 and Gerlagh et al.,
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2009). However, while the production and installation of renewable capacity will very
likely engender beneficial external learning effects,11 it is difficult to conceive of such
positive externalities from electricity generation. Based on these assumptions, the opti-
mal promotion scheme for renewable energies is a capacity subsidy.12 Generation-based
subsidies, instruments that are currently the most common promotion schemes, then
are likely even to be harmful.
However, some authors argue for subsidizing electricity from renewable-energy
sources as a second-best policy (cf. Bennear and Stavins, 2007, Kalkuhl et al., 2013).
According to this line of argument, the implementation of an efficient first-best instru-
ment – e.g., a correctly adjusted carbon tax – is impossible (or at least very unrealistic)
due to political (or other) constraints, but alternative second-best approaches can be a
pragmatic solution. The positive externalities of renewables then arise from the gen-
eration of electricity because renewables substitute fossil fuels. If this is deemed to
be the real cause to promote renewables, a generation-based subsidy may be welfare-
maximizing.If the short-run marginal benefits of abating carbon emissions are about
constant (cf. McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002), and if one additional kWh of electricity
from renewable energy sources approximately replaces one kWh of electricity from fos-
sil fuels (because the elasticity of electricity demand is low), then the marginal positive
externality of electricity from renewables is about constant, and we would suggest a
constant per-kWh subsidy.
11Positive externalities of capacity manufacturing arise from spillovers of learning-by-doing. Addi-
tional positive externalities may stem from research and development (R&D) spillovers. However, these
would be independent from the amount of manufactured capacity and are therefore not part of our
model. If these exist, an additional subsidy for R&D could be optimal, see, for instance, Fischer and
Newell, 2008.
12The level of optimal subsidies would depend on estimates of learning-spillover effects and, thus, is
an empirical question. Such estimates would have to be conducted separately for each technology.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dependence of Optimal Subsidies on the State of Demand and
the Availability of Supply
In the following proposition, we derive whether the optimal (marginal) subsidy should
change with the state of the world:
Proposition A.1 (Dependence of Optimal Subsidies on the State). Consider the states
(a, z) for which the optimal supply rule from Proposition 1 yields an interior solution,
q∗(z, ak) ∈ (0, ak), or assume that the subsidy scheme has the form of Proposition 7. Then
it must hold that
∂2χ(a, z, q∗)
∂z∂q
+
[
∂2χ(a, z, q∗)
∂q2
− b′′(q∗)
]
∂q∗
∂z
= 0, (A.1)
∂2χ(a, z, q∗)
∂a∂q
+
[
∂2χ(a, z, q∗)
∂q2
− b′′(q∗)
]
∂q∗
∂a
= 0. (A.2)
Proof. Differentiate (22).
To illustrate, suppose that subsidies take a particular (but typical) form:
Proposition A.2 (Per-Unit Subsidies). Suppose that subsidies are a fixed (but possibly
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state-dependent) per-unit payment on top of the market price:
η(a, z) = ∂χ(a, z, q)
∂q
. (A.3)
Then the dependence of subsidies on the state is given as follows:
∂η(a, z)
∂z
= b′′(q∗)∂q
∗
∂z
,
∂η(a, z)
∂a
= b′′(q∗)∂q
∗
∂a
. (A.4)
Proof. Substitute (A.3) in (A.1) and (A.2).
Thus, if marginal benefits are constant, the per-unit subsidy should be constant in
all states. By contrast, if marginal benefits are decreasing in q, (11) and (A.4) imply
that an increase in the strength of demand should lead to a lower per-unit subsidy if
the capacity limit is not binding. Likewise, by (12) and (A.4) an increase in capacity
availability should lower the per-unit subsidy if the capacity limit is binding.
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